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Abstract 
This paper discusses the role of financial services in the reduction of poverty. It first 
examines changing views about poverty and the design of poverty alleviation programs, both in 
the United States and the developing countries. It claims that fmancial services can play a role in 
incorporating the poor in processes of economic growth, but not in mitigating the plight of those 
with no productive opportunities. The paper briefly reviews the functions of finance in the 
economy and argues that there is a public interest in promoting the efficient provision of financial 
services. One potential cost of poorly designed programs is thus a reduced efficiency of the 
financial system. Moreover, credit programs that in the past pursued non-fmancial objectives have 
been generalized failures. Thus, financial services can assist the poor only when they do what 
finance is supposed to do: facilitate payments and liquidity management, intermediate, and deal 
with risk. Moreover, deposit facilities are usually more important for the poor than loans. In 
turn, the demand for credit is not just a demand for loanable funds; it is a demand for a client 
relationship that offers a credit reserve. Since this requires a sense of permanency, institutional 
viability is required. Lack of viability was the greatest shortcoming of the subsidized, targeted 
credit programs of the past. Informal finance is reliable, but limited in scope. Viable formal 
intermediaries must be developed, but this is a costly exercise. A hospitable policy environment, 
appropriate technologies, and incentive compatible organizational designs are required. 
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I. Concerns about Poverty 
As we get ready to complete the first half of the decade of the 1990s, growing concerns 
about poverty stand out in political agendas all over the industrialized and the developing worlds. 
The stubbornness of poverty, even in the richest of nations, is being met with increasing 
impatience, and governments of diverse ideological persuasions are trying to do something about 
it, while donors and other international agencies have been rushed into offering their support to 
these efforts. But, from good intentions to actual successful remedies there is a long way. Thus, 
both conceptualizers and practitioners are once again looking for operational approaches to deal 
with poverty. And so, the old question re-emerges: What about credit? 
As we well know, the extent to which the reduction of poverty and/or the alleviation of its 
consequences has been a public policy issue has differed significantly across countries and over 
time. Here in the United States, for example, poverty was at the top of the nation's agenda when 
1 Keynote speech at the Conference "Financial Services and the Poor: U.S. and Developing 
Country Experiences," organized by the USAID Financial Sector Development Project (FSDP II) 
and The Brookings Institution, in Washington, D.C., on September 28-30, 1994. The style of the 
oral presentation is preserved. 
2 Professor of Agricultural Economics and of Economics at The Ohio State University. 
Research in this area has been funded by the USAID Financial Resources Management (FIRM) 
Cooperative Agreement. The author is grateful to J.D. Von Pischke for the invitation and to 
several conference participants for comments. Additional comments have been received through 
the Devfinance electronic network based at Ohio State. 
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the War on Poverty was declared exactly 30 years ago (Harrington). No more than two decades 
later, however, in the early 1980s, not only was poverty merely one of several explicit policy 
concerns, but many chose instead to highlight the counterproductive nature and high fiscal costs 
of some of the poverty alleviation programs that had been adopted earlier (Reagan). More 
recently, as we move into the 1990s, public attention has focused again on the potential role of 
both government and of the publicly-supported non-government organizations (NGOs) in directly 
alleviating the continuing plight of the poor. 
Three decades ago, as new programs were being introduced and old programs were being 
expanded, an optimistic view prevailed. The belief was that if stable economic growth could be 
maintained, government actions could actually solve the poverty problem if only sufficient 
resources were devoted to the task (Danziger and Weinberg). In the letter of transmittal of the 
1964 Economic Report of the President, President Johnson announced: "We know what must be 
done, and this Nation of Abundance can surely afford to do it" (Johnson). Soon optimism was 
followed, however, by a diminishing faith in the government's ability to solve any problem 
(Aaron) and by strong arguments that social problems cannot be solved by "throwing money at 
them." Despite this skepticism, in the 1990s the pendulum of public opinion has been swinging 
back and new initiatives to address the challenge of poverty are being proposed. 
In general, among these recent initiatives, specialized credit programs for the poor are 
becoming increasingly popular (Jordan; Minsky et al.). As many believe that a more effective 
design of the poverty alleviation programs would prevent their earlier shortcomings, it becomes 
critical to identify lessons learned from earlier experiments. What do we know about more 
effective program designs? As experience accumulates on the performance of credit (and of other) 
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programs explicitly designed to assist the poor, there is thus a growing opportunity to take stock 
of which antipoverty policies have worked and which have not. A substantial abode of experience 
(positive and negative) on credit programs for the poor has been accumulated in low-income 
countries. Many of the lessons learned are relevant for the United States. 
The evolution of public policy has not been different in the developing nations, where 
poverty is so conspicuous. Leaving behind the "basic needs" paradigm of the 1970s, for most of 
the developing world the 1980s were a "decade of structural adjustment," dominated by 
stabilization efforts designed to bring national expenditure in line with national income (or output) 
as well as by attempts to increase national income, through policy reforms that have promoted a 
more efficient use of resources (Grootaert and Kanbur). 
There is a strong professional consensus that these adjustment programs of the 1980s were 
successful in moving many countries toward internal and external macroeconomic balance. The 
debate is intense, however, about whether these objectives could have been achieved "while better 
protecting the poor and providing the basis to incorporate them in the growth process." 
This is not the place to solve this issue. To begin with, establishing causality between 
specific policies and the evolution of the standards of living of different socio-economic groups 
is a particularly difficult exercise. This is also the case, of course, of attempts to establish the 
impact of credit programs on final beneficiaries (Rhyne). In the case of structural adjustment 
efforts, in any case, the outcome depends strongly on the initial conditions and on the types of 
policies adopted. 3 
3 I come from a country, Costa Rica, where these objectives of renewed growth with improved 
social conditions are being achieved quite successfully, and thus I am an optimist about well-
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In any case, regardless of whether the observed poverty outcomes of the 1980s stemmed 
from past policies which militated against growth or from the adjustment policies that inevitably 
followed as the earlier strategies failed (Morley), there is no doubt that both low-income country 
governments and international donors have been increasingly concerned with poverty alleviation. 
There are two dimensions to this preoccupation. A first type of concern relates to the need 
to achieve growth with equity over the long term. This requires policies and programs that foster 
the participation of the poor in the process of economic growth, by creating employment 
opportunities and by increasing their access to income-generating assets; and by raising the 
productivity of their assets, both physical and human (Grootaert and Kanbur). I believe that, if 
efficiently provided, financial services may play an important role in this task of incorporating 
(some of) the poor to processes of economic growth. 
A second type of concern relates to the need to mitigate the transitional cost of adjustment 
for the most vulnerable groups of society. I believe formal financial services can play a very 
limited role in this effort, if any. Other fiscal mechanisms provide a more cost -effective approach 
to assist those unfortunate who have no productive opportunities and, therefore, no debt capacity. 
The use of credit in this case carries an excessive social cost and is easily counterproductive, as 
one would not want to burden the inviable with additional debt they cannot repay (Adams). 
In dealing with these (poverty) issues it is always difficult to bridge the gap between moral 
obligations, calling for private and public charity, on the one hand, and the economic requirements 
that could improve the lot of the poor, on the other (Schultz). It appears, nevertheless, that 
designed structural adjustment programs. 
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financial services can have a sustainable economic role only in the second case, namely, when 
the opportunities for improvement do exist. To understand why this is the case, one needs to 
appreciate the nature of finance and the importance of its economic contributions. 
II. Functions of Finance 
The financial system is a key component of the institutional infrastructure that is required 
for the efficient operation of all markets. The most important contribution of the financial system 
is its ability to induce a larger size and foster a greater degree of integration of the markets for 
good and services, factors of production, and other assets. This expansion of markets is a 
precondition for powerful processes of division of labor and specialization, greater competition, 
the use of modern technologies, and the exploitation of economies of scale and of economies of 
scope. As already noted by Adam Smith, these are the processes that increase the productivity 
of available resources and lead to economic growth. 
The expansion and integration of markets is achieved through the provision of monetization 
services and the efficient management of the payments system, the development of services of 
intermediation between surplus and deficit economics agents, and the establishment of 
opportunities for the accumulation of stores of value, the management of liquidity, and the 
transformation, sharing, pooling, and diversification of risk (Long). 
Particularly important are the services of financial intermediation, which transfer 
purchasing power from agents with resources in excess of those needed to take advantage of their 
own (internal) opportunities (surplus agents, such as savers), to those with better opportunities but 
not enough resources of their own (deficit agents, such as investors). By making this division of 
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labor between savers and investors possible, financial intermediaries channel resources from 
producers, activities, and regions with a limited growth potential to those where a more rapid 
expansion of output is possible. 
Since there always are more economic agents who claim that they have superior uses for 
resources than there is purchasing power available, financial markets must contribute to the 
selection of the best possible uses of resources. These markets can also offer monitoring services, 
ensuring that funds are profitably used, as promised, and they can contribute to the enforcement 
of contracts, making sure that those who have borrowed repay the loans (Stiglitz). After all, 
finance is about promises to pay in the future that are expected to be fulfilled. The conditions of 
such repayment influence, in turn, who bears what risks. 
I cannot sufficiently emphasize the extent to which the efficient provision of financial 
services is extremely critical for the operation of the economy at large. Because financial markets 
essentially influence the allocation of resources, Stiglitz has compared them to the "brain" of the 
entire economic system, the central locus of decisionmaking: if they fail. .. the performance of 
the entire economic system may be impaired. Why this is the case is a complex question, but if 
it is indeed so, there is clearly a major social interest at stake here. Most governments have 
recognized this and many have gone to extremes in order to prevent a collapse of their financial 
systems. Frequently, however, while recognizing but (mis)understanding their powers, 
governments have intervened in financial markets, in the pursuit of a varied range of worthy non-
financial objectives, but with negative consequences. 
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III. Finance and Poverty: Lessons from the Past 
A good number of the initiatives to directly assist the poor with financial services (may) 
fall under this category of unsuccessful interventions. In considering such interventions, 
moreover, a key question to address is their potential cost in terms of the reduced efficiency of the 
fmancial system at large. This is a cost that it might be worth enduring, if the expected benefits 
were sufficiently large. Unfortunately, this is typically not the case, given the very nature of 
financial markets. 
This is one of the most important lessons learned from earlier attempts to use formal 
financial markets to ostensibly promote particular activities, to compensate producers for other 
repressive policies, to free them from the grip of moneylenders, or to redistribute income towards 
the poor (Gonzalez-Vega 1993). The subsidized interest rates and administrative loan allocations 
through targeted credit programs, used for these purposes, did not displace informal sources of 
fmancial services and hardly promoted anything. They only redistributed income, but in reverse, 
from poor to rich (Gonzalez-Vega 1984). So, despite the best of intentions, they frequently turned 
out to be harmful for the particular segments of the population (marginal clientele) they had been 
set out to help. 
These outcomes are well known and have been extensively documented for dozens of 
countries (Adams et al.). Too much effort was spent in small farmer credit programs, for 
example, to obtain meager results. The primary objective of increasing the farmers' access to 
formal credit was poorly met and a reduction in the cost of borrowing was achieved only for a few 
larger borrowers. Despite artificially low interest rates, formal credit did not become cheap for 
small rural producers and most credit portfolios became concentrated in a few hands. More 
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importantly, these government-sponsored credit programs distracted attention from technological 
innovation, infrastructure development, and human capital formation, which directly increase the 
productivity of resources. Finance, instead, can only contribute to this goal indirectly, by making 
it possible for some to take advantage of the opportunities created by those other growth-inducing 
processes. In the absence of such opportunities, however, there is only a limited role for finance 
to play. 4 
There is an increasing body of evidence confirming that economic growth and reductions 
in poverty go hand in hand. Clearly, a substantial improvement in living standards requires 
economic growth (Biggs et al.). Further, securing full participation of the poor in such process 
is a long-term effort and it involves improving their employability, expanding the educational 
opportunities for their children, improving the performance of labor markets, creating a hospitable 
environment for their productive activities and much more. An efficient provision of the fmancial 
services that they demand is part (but only a part) of all of this process. 
So, to the question "Can fmancial services be used to assist the poor in improving their 
lot?" the answer is "only when finance is allowed to do what finance is supposed to do." That 
is, only when: 
(a) finance allows a transfer of purchasing power from uses with low to uses with high 
marginal rates of return; 
(b) finance contributes to more efficient inter-temporal decisions about saving, the 
accumulation of assets, and investment; 
4 Even in stagnant economies, nevertheless, finance plays a role in consumption smoothing. 
This role is frequently performed well by informal financial arrangements (Udry). 
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(c) finance makes possible a less costly management of liquidity and accumulation of stores 
of value; and 
(d) finance offers better ways to deal with the risks implicit in economic activities. 
Otherwise, financial interventions (such as the early subsidized and targeted credit 
programs) are a weak instrument to achieve different, non-financial objectives and frequently lead 
to unexpectedly negative outcomes (Gonzalez-Vega, 1994). This section can be summarized with 
the proposition that many ingredients are needed for the poor to come out of poverty and that 
credit is only one of them. Credit is an important ingredient, but it is not even the most important 
one. Financial services play the key role of facilitating the work of growth-promoting forces, but 
only when the opportunities exist. 
IV. Lessons Learned about Loans and Deposits 
A second important lesson learned from accumulated experience is that, among financial 
services, credit is not the only one that is important for the poor. In particular, deposit facilities 
provide valuable services for liquidity management and for the accumulation of stores of value by 
poor firm-households. Researchers are always surprised by the intensity of the demand for deposit 
facilities in the rural areas of very poor countries (Gonzalez-Vega et al.). Satisfaction of this 
demand has been a distinctive feature of programs that have been successful in delivering financial 
services to the poor (Robinson). An outstanding example is the unit des a program of the Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia, with over 12,000,000 small depositors for only over 2,000,000 small borrowers 
(Patten and Rosengard). Thus, while not all producers demand loans and, among those who do, 
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they do not demand credit all of the time, most (if not all) economic agents demand deposit and 
other facilities for liquidity management and reserve accumulation, all of the time. 5 
A third lesson from direct experience is that the demand for credit is not just a demand for 
loanable funds. Finance is intimately linked to inter-temporal decisions, and in this sense it plays 
a critical role not only in savings and investment processes but also in dealing with the lack of 
synchronization between income generating (production) and spending activities (consumption and 
input use decisions), as well. Finance is also closely associated with risk management. It 
facilitates the accumulation of reserves for precautionary reasons (to be able to survive 
emergencies) and for speculative purposes (to be able to take advantage of unexpected future 
opportunities). For this, being creditworthy is critical. 
Being creditworthy is equivalent to possessing a credit reserve: poor people do not 
necessarily want a loan now; they want the opportunity to get one, if and when they need it 
(Baker). They want this potential access to a loan to be reliable, to result in a timely and flexible 
disbursement of funds, to be always there. Because the informal sources of credit do offer these 
opportunities, poor people are reluctant to substitute formal sources of funds, no matter how 
subsidized, for the flexible and reliable informal fmancial arrangements that have served them well 
over the years. 
Thus, what matters 1s not just access to loanable funds but the development of an 
established credit relationship. This, in turn, implies a sense of permanency of the financial 
5 At the Conference, Catherine Mansell emphasized the importance of payments services, 
particularly for remittances and other money transfers. I fully agree that this is another important 
service for the poor. 
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institution. A fourth lesson learned, in this connection, is that a financial intermediary cannot 
project an image of permanency if it does not provide valuable services (of high quality) to its 
clientele and if it is not financially and institutionally viable. 
V. Institutional Viability and the Poor 
With every program we have learned that the most severe deficiency of the earlier 
interventions to provide financial services to the poor was the lack of institutional viability of the 
organizations that were created for that purpose. Why does viability matter so much? Concern 
with viability springs first from a clear recognition of the scarcity of resources. If resources are 
limited, without self-sufficient financial institutions there is little hope for reaching the numbers 
of poor firm-households that are potential borrowers and depositors. The amounts required are 
beyond the ability and willingness of governments and donors to provide them (Otero and Rhyne). 
The alternative to viable organizations are expensive, inviable quasi-fiscal programs that reach 
only a select few beneficiaries. Thus, viability matters the most from this equity perspective: to 
be able to reach more than just a privileged few. Moreover, if the objective were just a one-time 
(transitory) injection of funds, then lump-sum transfers are always a more efficient way of 
accomplishing this. If, on the other hand, sustainability is important, then the viability of the 
financial organization matters. 
Further, in addition to being fiscally feasible, the most important contribution of a concern 
with institutional viability is that it elicits appropriate incentives among all the participants in 
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financial transactions. 6 Thus, for example, while poor loan recovery rapidly destroys viability, 
an image of viability improves repayment discipline. A reputation as a good borrower in an 
established intermediary-client relationship is a more valuable intangible asset if the financial 
institution is expected to be permanent rather than transitory. When this intangible asset is 
sufficiently valuable, it elicits punctual repayment. When the organization's survival is 
questioned, on the other hand, default follows in stampede, and institutional breakdown becomes 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. Viability matters when repayment matters. 
In this way, a concern with viability makes it possible to identify one way how interest 
rates and default rates are linked. Too low interest rates that cause intermediary losses are 
perceived by borrowers as signals of lack of permanency and thus delinquency follows. 
Moreover, in the same way that very high interest rates may induce adverse selection (Stiglitz and 
Weiss), too low rates tend to attract rent seekers who eventually default (Gonzalez-Vega 1993). 
Thus, both too high or too low interest rates may reduce expected intermediary profits through 
higher expected default rates. 
As another example, the targeting of loan uses, irrelevant because of the fungibility of 
funds (Von Pischke and Adams), basically increases both lender and borrower transaction costs 
and reduces the quality of the services supplied by the intermediary and thus lowers the value of 
the intermediary-client relationship. 
6 In this sense, financial viability concerns are a potential substitute for an appropriate 
structure of property rights, in generating compatible incentives among both the staff and the 
clients of the organization. 
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In summary, targeting hurts viability in several ways. It reduces the scope for portfolio 
diversification in already highly specialized lenders. It limits the lender's degrees of freedom in 
screening loan applicants, and it reduces incentives for vigorous loan collection, shifting 
accountability for default from the lender to the donor that conditions the availability of funds to 
their use for specific targets (Aguilera-Alfred and Gonzalez-Vega). More interested in monitoring 
compliance with the targets, for a long time many donors ignored this potential impact of targeting 
on delinquency, but they were very surprised when rampant default destroyed the institutions that 
had been (ab)used to easily channel donor funds. 
Finally, deposit mobilization is also intimately linked to the importance of institutional 
viability. Deposits provide information to the lender about the potential borrowers, create a basis 
of mutual trust, and facilitate the accumulation of a downpayment that can serve as a deductible 
in any future loan contract. Deposits contribute, therefore, to the solution of difficult information 
problems frequently encountered in financial markets. Moreover, healthy deposit mobilization 
creates an image of institutional viability that promotes repayment. Thus, while donor-funded 
loans may not be repaid, those funded with the neighbor's deposits are (Aguilera-Alfred and 
Gonzalez-Vega). 
Most importantly, depositors create institutional independence from the whims of donors 
and politicians; they shield the financial organization from political intrusion (Poyo, Gonzalez-
Vega and Aguilera-Alfred). In general, deposit mobilization contributes to sustainability and to 
an organizational environment (corporate culture) where permanency becomes an important 
(compatible) incentive to attract and retain competent managers and induce the agency's staff to 
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behave in ways compatible with the viability of organization.7 For them, the value of their 
relationship with the organization increases when deposits are an important source of funds. This 
encourages correct decisions and effort (Chaves 1993). 
VI. Formal and Informal Finance 
Recapitulating my statements up to this point: 
(a) The poor need more than just financial services; the non-financial ingredients of growth 
and development matter. 
(b) The poor need more than just credit; deposit facilities may matter even more. 
(c) The poor need more than just loanable funds; they need a permanent, flexible and reliable 
credit relationship. 
(d) In consequence, the poor need viable, efficient, profitable, well-managed financial 
intermediaries with which to establish these permanent relationships. 
One important additional lesson increasingly learned over the past decades is that informal 
financial arrangements are pervasive and very successful in providing several (some) types of 
fmancial services among the poor (Bouman and Hospes). They are timely, reliable, and levy low 
transaction costs on their clients, mostly for loans of small amounts and at short terms. The value 
and importance of these informal financial arrangements have been increasingly recognized and 
visions of exploitation have been replaced by attempts to either replicate their features or link 
7 Deposit mobilization, on the other hand, is not an easy task. It requires an appropriate 
organizational design, liability management techniques, and prudential supervision to protect 
depositors. 
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informal lenders to national financial networks (Adams and Fitchett). But, as Hugo Pirela has 
asked "if this is the case, why would additional (semi-formal and formal) financial intermediaries 
be needed to do a job that indigenous, informal arrangements are already doing to well?" The fact 
is that, despite their valuable contributions, informal financial arrangements suffer from several 
limitations. 
These shortcomings stem from the very features that make informal transactions 
competitive in the first place. They are grounded in the local economy and are thereby limited by 
the local wealth constraints and the covariant risks of the local economy. As a result, their frontier 
is narrow; they do not go far enough in scope (geographically, over time, and across products). 
Informal finance provides valuable services, but in small amounts, for short periods of time. 
These services are not always good vehicles for long-term investment, for example. More 
importantly, because they are cost effective only in the immediate neighborhood, informal 
transactions do not overcome market segmentation and do not contribute much to the most 
important function of finance: the integration of markets. For this task, formal financial 
institutions with a national scope are required. 
VII. The Costs of Finance 
Developing national financial systems is not an easy task. The main reason is that the 
provision of financial services is very expensive. Formal fmancial services are almost equivalent 
to a luxury good. Their production requires valuable human and material resources with high 
opportunity costs. Moreover, mistakes in the evaluation of creditworthiness are costly both for 
the intermediary and for society. 
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Some of these costs are associated with getting the transacting parties together. In this 
task, formal finance usually implies high fixed costs; this is certainly the case with bank branches. 
These fixed costs loom particularly high when the clients are small, heterogeneous, and dispersed 
in sparsely populated areas. The key to the level of these costs is market size, and this is not 
unique to financial services. It is expensive to provide health, education, or entertainment in 
remote areas with a low density of population. In informal fmance, on the other hand, these costs 
are low, given the nature of the technologies used and the proximity of the transacting parties. 
Moreover, successful finance requires inputs for screening loan applicants (information 
management for creditworthiness evaluation and loan approval), for monitoring borrowers, and 
for the efficient design and enforcement of contracts. These costs are a function of distance 
(geographic, occupational, ethnic) and of feasible technologies used to produce these services. 
In addition, alternative technological arrangements result in specific comparative advantages in 
the provision of financial services in specific market niches. The choice of appropriate technology 
thus becomes critical. 
Much technological progress has taken place in the area of microfmance (Christen, Rhyne, 
and Vogel). The key to success is to design an intervention that is properly dimensioned to the 
size of the market and compatible with the nature of the clientele (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega). 
Traditional banking technology, for example, is prohibitively expensive for loans to the poor. 
Both lender and borrower transaction costs are too high in this case. Moreover, as the poor are 
so heterogeneous, so are the financial services that they demand, creating opportunities for 
different types of intermediaries. 
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Banks may, of course, adopt more information-intensive technologies than those that rely 
on traditional collateral; that is, embark on "downgrading" strategies (Krahnen and Schmidt). 
Although there are major advantages in using banks as intermediaries, to reach marginal clientele 
they need a technological revolution. Other non-bank organizations may possess comparative 
advantages in information and contract enforcement among this clientele. They may eventually 
be "upgraded" to become more like banks. 
In either case, the challenge is to bring together those who have the informational and 
enforcement advantages (usually local agents) and those with sufficient resources and a willingness 
to lend and to accept the risks implied (governments and donors). This generates, however, 
significant agency costs as governments, donors, apex organizations, or bank headquarters have 
to monitor the decentralized operations of branches, credit unions, NGOs and the like (Jensen and 
Meckling). 
VIII. The Role of Organizations 
There are two possible approaches to the question of improving access to credit by 
particular groups, such as the poor: 
(a) One may mandate portfolio quotas at banks and create special targeted lines of credit 
within existing formal institutions. Most likely this will not be the appropriate technology 
to reach the poor. One may even mandate subsidized loans for the target group; this has 
always been counterproductive, hurting in the end the intended beneficiaries. 
(b) Alternatively, one may promote the development of viable intermediaries with a vocation 
for and a comparative advantage in specific market niches. The desired clientele would 
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be reached indirectly, by targeting the development of institutions that typically service 
these groups. In this way, the problem will be addressed by developing appropriate 
technologies. 
For this second approach to be successful, however, some strict conditions must be met. 
Past experience has shown that no constraints on risk management should be placed on the lender, 
which should have full flexibility in evaluating creditworthiness and in collecting loans. In 
general, these intermediaries should be allowed to operate on market terms. These are common 
features of successful interventions, which have worked with, not against, the market (Chaves and 
Gonzalez-Vega). 
Appropriate technology is clearly a necessary condition for reaching the poor with 
sustainable financial services. It is not a sufficient condition, however. While policies, 
procedures and technologies matter, policies will not be enacted, procedures will not be revised, 
and technologies will not be adopted, unless it is in someone's interest to do so. In the end, all 
decisions are made by individuals, who pursue their own objective functions, given existing 
constraints. 
Institutions constrain individual behavior, define property rights and incentives, and 
embody the rules of the game (North). Organizational design matters a lot because individual 
choices are induced and/ or constrained by the structure of incentives within the organization. 
Organizational design is critical because it influences behavior and behavior influences 
performance. If what matters is not just loanable funds but viable organizations, emphasis on 
designing efficient and viable organizations is critical. The dilemma is that a flood of donor and 
government funds tends to destroy adequate organizational designs. Because wealth constraints 
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matter, how to overcome those constraints without at the same time destroying the intermediary 
involved is a major challenge. 
It seems that the most difficult remaining question in the provision of financial services to 
the poor is thus the design of organizations with the correct structure of incentives and governance 
rules (Chaves 1994). As this depends so much on the structure of property rights of the 
organization, there are serious questions about the extent to which intermediaries with diffused 
property rights structures (such as the old public development banks and the new NGOs) or with 
conflicting governance rules (such as credit cooperatives) will be able to generate sustainable 
financial intermediation. The greatest challenge for the progress of finance for the poor, 
therefore, is in the institutional design of such organizations. This is, according to Krahnen and 
Schmidt, the most promising and critical area for future donor assistance. 
Moreover, because of several limitations of locally-based financial arrangements (limited 
opportunities for risk diversification and intermediation), appropriate links of the local 
intermediaries to the aggregate financial system must be established, in order to increase the 
viability of enforcement-effective and informationally-advantaged agents, which may suffer from 
local, covariant, systemic risks and from limited opportunities for intermediation between surplus 
and deficit units. Ultimately, what matters is the development of financial systems and networks 
(e.g., new ways of economic organization). As markets grow and institutions are developed, 
formality will increase (although informality will not disappear), and the introduction of modern 
institutions will be required. For this, appropriate policies, cost-effective technologies, and viable 
organizational designs will still be needed. 
REFERENCES 
Aaron, Henry (1978), Politics and the Professors: The Great Society in Perspective, Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution. 
Adams, Dale W (1994), "Altruistic or Production Finance?: A Donor's Dilemma," Economics 
and Sociology Occasional Paper No. 2150, Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University. 
Adams, Dale W and Delbert A. Fitchett (eds.), (1992), Informal Finance in Low-Income 
Countries, Boulder, Co. : Westview Press. 
Adams, Dale W, Douglas H. Graham, and J.D. Von Pischke (eds.), (1984), Undermining Rural 
Development with Cheap Credit, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. 
Aguilera-Alfred, Nelson and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega (1993), "A Multinomial Logit Analysis of 
Loan Targeting and Repayment at the Agricultural Development Bank of the Dominican 
Republic," Agricultural Finance Review, Vol. 53: 55-64. 
Baker, Chester (1973), "Role of Credit in the Economic Development of Small Farm 
Agriculture," Small Farmer Credit Analytical Papers, Washington, D.C.: Agency for 
International Development Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit. 
Biggs, Tyler, Merilee S. Grindle and Donald R. Snodgrass (1988), "The Informal Sector, Policy 
Reform, and Structural Transformation," in Jerry Jenkins (ed.), Beyond the Informal 
Sector. Including the Excluded in Developing Countries, San Francisco, Ca.: Institute for 
Contemporary Studies. 
Bouman, F.J.A. and Otto Hospes (eds.) (1994), Financial Landscapes Reconstructed. The Fine 
Art of Mapping Development, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. 
Chaves, Rodrigo A. (1993), "Permanencia y Viabilidad de las Organizaciones Privadas de 
Desarrollo y sus Fuentes de Recursos," in Claudio Gonzalez-Vega and Tomas Miller-
Sanabria (eds.), Financiamiento y Apoyo ala Microempresa, San Jose: The Ohio State 
University and Academia de Centroamerica. 
Chaves, Rodrigo A. (1994), "The Behavior and Performance of Credit Cooperatives: An 
Analysis of Cooperative Governance Rules," Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbus, Ohio: The 
Ohio State University. 
Chaves, Rodrigo A. and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega (1994b), "The design of Successful Rural 
Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from Indonesia," World Development, forthcoming. 
20 
21 
Christen, Robert Peck, Elisabeth Rhyne and Robert C. Vogel (1994), "Maximizing the Outreach 
of Microenterprise Finance: The Emerging Lessons of Successful Programs," 
Washington, D.C.: IMCC, unpublished report. 
Danziger, Sheldon H. and Daniel H. Weinberg (1986), "Introduction," in Sheldon H. Danziger 
and Daniel H. Weinberg (eds.), Fighting Poverty. What Works and What Doesn't, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Gonzalez-Vega Claudio (1984), "Cheap Agricultural Credit: Redistribution in Reverse," in Dale 
W Adams, Douglas H. Graham, and J.D. Von Pischke (eds.), Undermining Rural Devel-
opment with Cheap Credit, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. 
Gonzalez-Vega, Claudio (1993), "From Policies, to Technologies, to Organizations: The 
Evolution of The Ohio State University Vision of Rural Financial Markets," Economics 
and Sociology Occasional Paper No. 2062, Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University. 
Gonzalez-Vega, Claudio (1994), "Stages in the Evolution of Thought on Rural Finance. A Vision 
from The Ohio State University," Economics and Sociology Occasional Paper No. 2134, 
Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University. 
Gonzalez-Vega, Claudio, Jose Alfredo Guerrero, Archibaldo Vasquez and Cameron Thraen 
(1992), "La Demanda por Servicios de Deposito en las Areas Rurales de la Republica Do-
minicana," in Claudio Gonzalez-Vega (ed. ), Republica Dominicana: Mercados Financieros 
Rurales y Mouilizaci6n de Depositos, Santo Domingo: The Ohio State University. 
Grootaert, Christiaan and Ravi Kanbur (1990), "Policy-Oriented Analysis of Poverty and the 
Social Dimensions of Structural Adjustment," Washington, D.C.: The World Bank SDA 
Working Paper. 
Harrington, Michael (1962), The Other America: Poverty in the United States, New York: 
MacMillan. 
Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling (1976), "Theory of the Firm, Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure," Journal of Financial Economics, 3:305-360. 
Johnson, Lyndon (1964), "Letter of Transmittal," in Economic Report of the President, 
Washington, D.C.: GPO. 
Jordan, Jerry L. (1993), "Community Lending and Economic Development," Economic Com-
mentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, November. 
Krahnen, Jan Pieter and Reinhard H. Schmidt (1994), Development Finance as Institution Build-
ing. A New Approach to Poverty-Oriented Banking, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. 
22 
Long, Millard (1983), "A Note on Financial Theory and Economic Development," in J.D. Von 
Pischke, Dale W Adams and Gordon Donald (eds.), Rural Financial Markets in Develop-
ing Countries. Their Use and Abuse, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Minsky, Hyman P. et al. (1993), "Community Development Banking," Public Policy Brief No. 
3, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. 
Morley, Samuel A. (1994), Poverty and Inequality in Latin America: Past Evidence, Future Pros-
pects, Washington, D.C. : Overseas Development Council Policy Essay No. 13. 
North, Douglass C. (1992), Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic Peiformance, San 
Francisco, CA: International Center for Economic Growth. 
Patten Richard H. and Jay K. Rosengard (1991), Progress with Profits. The Development of Rural 
Banking in Indonesia, San Francisco, Ca.: International Center for Economic Growth. 
Pirela Martinez, Hugo (1990), "The Grey Area in Microenterprise Development," Grass Roots 
Development, VoL 14, No. 2: 33-40. 
Poyo, Jeffrey, Claudio Gonzalez-Vega and Nelson Aguilera-Alfred, "The Depositor as a Principal 
in Public Development Banks and Credit Unions: Illustrations from the Dominican 
Republic," Economics and Sociology Occasional Paper No. 2061, Columbus, Ohio: The 
Ohio State University. 
Reagan, Ronald (1982), "Remarks Before the National Black Republican Council," September 14, 
1982 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 18: 1152-1157, Washington, D.C.: 
GPO. 
Rhyne, Elisabeth (1994), "A New View of Finance Program Evaluation," in Maria Otero and 
Elisabeth Rhyne (eds.), The New World of Microenterprise Finance. Building Healthy 
Financial Institutions for the Poor, West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press. 
Rhyne, Elisabeth and Maria Otero (1994), "Financial Services for Microenterprises: Principles 
and Institutions," in Maria Otero and Elisabeth Rhyne (eds.), The New World of Micro-
enterprise Finance. Building Healthy Financial Institutions for the Poor, West Hartford, 
Conn.: Kumarian Press. 
Rhyne, Elisabeth and Linda S. Rotblatt (1994), 'What Makes Them Tick? Exploring the Anatomy 
of Major Microenterprise Finance Organizations, Cambridge, Mass.: A CCI ON Interna-
tional monograph Series No. 9. 
23 
Robinson, Marguerite S. (1994), "Financial Intermediation at the Local Level: Lessons from 
Indonesia," Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Institute for International Development, Develop-
ment Discussion Paper No. 482. 
Robinson, Marguerite S. (1994), "Savings Mobilization and Microenterprise Finance: The 
Indonesian Experience," in Maria Otero and Elisabeth Rhyne (eds.), The New World of 
Microenterprise Finance. Building Healthy Financial Institutions for the Poor, West 
Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press. 
Shultz, Theodore W. (1992), "Foreword," in Tarsicio Costafieda, Combatting Poverty. Innova-
tive Social Reforms in Chile During the 1980s, San Francisco, Ca.: International Center 
for Economic Growth. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1993), "The Role of the State in Financial Markets," Proceeding of the World 
Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. and Andrew Weiss (1981), "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Infor-
mation," American Economic Review, Vol. 71, No.3: 393-410. 
Udry, Christopher (1990), "Credit Markets in Northern Nigeria: Credit as Insurance in a Rural 
Economy," The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 4, No.3, pp. 251-71. 
Von Pischke, J.D. (1991), Finance at the Frontier. Debt Capacity and the Role of Credit in the 
Private Economy, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
Von Pischke, J.D. and Dale W Adams (1983), "Fungibility and the Design and Evaluation of 
Agricultural Credit Project," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 62, No. 
4, November. 

